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Assessing the Efficacy of Gaming in Economics Education
Abstract
In this study, the effectiveness of experimental gaming, relative to traditional lecturing, is assessed
as a means of conveying economic insights and principles. To that end, we randomly assigned
students to either a game group or a lecture group. For three lessons, the two subgroups were
subjected to gaming and lecturing, respectively. A standard before-after test format revealed that
the students who participated in the (macroeconomic) experimental game did significantly better in
terms of learning achievements. Perhaps even more importantly, our study revealed that it may be
hazardous to rely on students’ own judgements in this respect. We found no significant or
systematic correlation between the learning achievements as measured by the before-after multiple
choice tests and students’ own evaluations of these achievements, as measured by a questionnaire.2
Assessing the Efficacy of Classroom Games in Economics Education
1. Introduction
The growing acceptance of experimental economics as a research method, has also led to an
increased interest in using games and experiments in economics education (Fels, 1993). Although
the introduction of such (computer) games may involve considerable set-up costs, apart from being
enjoyable, these games are often claimed to be an effective means of passing knowledge and skills
on to students. For example, being a trader in a market game allows students to experience the
equilibrating forces of competition, playing a public goods game gives students a feel for potential
conflicts between individual rationality and collective efficiency, and running a government in a
policy game requires students to consider the various trade offs and international repercussions of
monetary and fiscal policies. The claimed efficacy of gaming seems to be supported by subjective
indications: positive impressions of students and teachers, and outcomes of questionnaires. There is
a lack, however, of more formal objective evidence, as may be illustrated by the following
quotations.
’I am convinced of the efficacy of classroom market experiments. However, this conclusion is
drawn from anecdotal evidence (positive remarks made by students) and subjective analysis’
(DeYoung, 1993, p. 348). ’Our primary objective is to stimulate and motivate students. (...) At
present, we have no formal statistical evidence that participation in the exercises improves
students’ performance on traditional objective test items’ (Williams and Walker, 1993, p. 308).
And Fels (1993, p. 365), in his evaluating essay, remarked: ’Proponents of the [gaming] method
did not provide evidence that students learned more’ and ’It is ironic that those who use controlled
experiments in their research (...) do not use controlled experiments to evaluate their teaching
[methods].’
A primary goal of the present article is to address this deficiency. We report on an objective test3
of the efficacy of a classroom game. That is, instead of relying solely on subjective evidence, we
assessed the game in terms of students’ performance on a traditional (multiple-choice) exam. To
put it bluntly, the knowledge gained by the students was measured, and not just asked about.
At the outset, three methodological points should be noted. First, we address the relative
effectiveness of one such game. That is, we compare the game with an alternative educational tool.
The reason for this lies in the problem an economics teacher faces: If I can use my lecture time to
either give an ordinary lecture or to employ a game covering the same topics, should I prefer the
game to a regular lecture? The fact that students learn something from being in a game (as found
by Woltjer, 1995, for instance) is not a very useful criterion in this respect. A necessary condition
to warranting the extra set-up cost of a game is that students learn more than from ordinary
lectures.
1
A second and related point is that, in many instances, the experiments or games used in
economics education are optional. As a consequence, the findings may well suffer from a self-
selection bias. Those students that expect to gain most are the ones most likely to participate (Berg
et al., 1994). We avoid this self-selection bias by randomly assigning students to either the group
that is subjected to a game or the group that follows traditional lectures.
The third methodological remark concerns the terms under which the educational efficacy is
assessed. It seems reasonable to compare a game and a lecture only if they have the same main
goals. Many experiments and games have multiple purposes, such as ’heightening interest and
motivation, putting students into situations in which they must articulate positions and ideas, and
training students to apply skills they will later need’ (Greenblat and Duke, 1981). Traditional
lectures may have other purposes as well: to convey information about institutions, past events, the
history of ideas, or, in short, ‘fact mastery’. This latter type of goal can usually not be achieved
with gaming. Therefore, we compared a game and a lecture that were both designed to convey the
same analytical economic insights and principles.
A second, and perhaps even more important goal of our paper is to assess the reliability of4
subjective students’ evaluations on the usefulness of games. To this end, we compared what
students claimed to have learned, as indicated in a questionnaire, to what they actually learned, as
measured by the exams. As noted above, the present evidence regarding the efficacy of games is
almost exclusively based on information obtained from questionnaires filled in by students.
2 This
is not surprising in view of the easy availability of questionnaire results relative to the comprehen-
sive task of objectively assessing the efficacy of an educational tool. Therefore, it would be very
comforting to know that questionnaire results are a reliable source of information in this respect.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief sketch of the
game that we compared to traditional lectures. In Section 3 the experimental design of the efficacy
test is described, and in Section 4 the results are presented. In Section 5 we discuss the extent to
which the (subjective) questionnaire results match the results from the (objective) exams. Section 6
summarizes the main conclusions.
2. Sketch of the SIER Game
The SIER Game (SIER stands for Simulating International Economic Relations) is a macro game
developed at Tilburg University. Roughly speaking, the format of the game is as follows.
3 After
an introductory lecture on the underlying economic model, four teams of players are formed. The
world is assumed to consist of four hypothetical countries, each governed by one such team, the
‘governments’. Each government tries to achieve a level of welfare for its own electorate that
exceeds the welfare levels in the other three countries by the end of the game. A game consists of
a series of policy rounds. At the end of each round, after the four governments have taken their
policy measures, a personal computer uses the economic model to calculate the results for that
round. These results determine the starting positions for the subsequent period. Players discuss the
new situation in their countries (and in other countries) and again formulate their policies, where
the teacher’s role is to stimulate discussions between the players and to provide them with the5
information (e.g., regarding the economic model) that they ask for. The policies determined by the
players result in a new state of the economies, and so on.
A team achieves a higher welfare level than the other teams if it manipulates the instruments of
economic policy more ably than the others. Assuming that the electorate’s voting behaviour
depends on its welfare, the end of the game is regarded as election time, and the winning group is
defined as the group with the best chances of being re-elected. The electorate’s welfare (the goal
function) depends on real private consumption, unemployment, price stability, the balance of
payments and, depending on the version played (see below), either the government deficit or the
rate of interest. Depending on the policies chosen, world welfare may rise or fall.
The economies contain a dynamic investment block and their product markets may be described
in an AS/AD framework with possible underutilization of labour owing to nominal wage rigidity.
The policy instruments which the players may change each period are:
- rates of labour income tax, profit tax, social security tax;
- commercial policy (i.c., three, possibly different, import tariffs);
- government purchases and number of civil servants;
- wage policies (private wages, salaries of civil servants, level of welfare benefits);
- optional: exchange rate policy and monetary policy.
Two key features of the SIER game are the following. First, the four economies are linked. As
a consequence, the decisions of each team not only influence their own economy, but also the
other economies, and vice versa. Second, the teacher may adopt the economic model that (s)he
thinks to be most appropriate for the present class. To this end, (s)he chooses the level of complex-
ity. For example, (s)he chooses expectations that are either backward looking or forward looking,
reactions by consumers to price changes that are either fast or slow, production factors that are
either substitutes or complements in the short run, exchange rates that are either fixed or flexible, a
monetary sector that is either explicit or implicit, international capital mobility that is either present
or absent. Nominal wages may depend on factors like inflation, unemployment and/or productivity.6
3. Design of the Experiment
As indicated in the Introduction, the first purpose of the experiment was to compare the efficacy of
lectures applying the SIER game with that of traditional lectures on the same topics. The topic of
the lectures in the experiment was: How are economic concepts related in a specific model describ-
ing a dynamic, interconnected world economy? Since we were studying the efficacy of teaching
tools, the test was to be carried out in a regular school situation, with students who take exams on
the topics dealt with, who are graded on these exams, and who receive credit if they pass. To this
end, three classes at a part-time economics college were randomly split into two groups during a
part of the spring semester of 1995: a Game Group playing the SIER game and a Lecture Group
following traditional lectures. A comparison of the results of the examinations that were held
before and after the respective lectures indicated how much the students in both groups had
learned. Roughly speaking, this is the format suggested by Fels (1993).
As far as the participants in the experiment are concerned, the three classes contained 47
students in total. The two classes that met on Wednesdays were similar, the class that met on
Fridays worked with a somewhat lower level. The level of the game and of the lectures were
adjusted accordingly.
4 All three classes played an introductory level of the SIER Game in the
autumn semester of 1994. Hence, also the students in the Lecture Groups had experience with the
game.
Before giving some more details and motivations, we will briefly describe the sequence of
events. The steps are summarized in Table 1.
A (week 1) Before the lectures started, the participants were told:
- that there would be three tests for all students on their understanding of the
economic model (in fact, there were four tests, but the third one was to be
kept secret, see below);7
- what the material required for each of the tests was;
- that their grades on Test 1 and Test 2 would be averaged, yielding an optional
‘bonus grade’ that would make up half of the grade on the final exam (Test 4)
on this topic.
5
B (week 1) All three classes received a 1.5 hours introduction to the economic model that
was to be studied.
C (week 2) Test 1 (45 minutes) was taken. All tests (1-4) consisted of a set of multiple-
choice (MC) questions. Moreover, to each test (except for Test 4) a questionnaire
was attached in which the student was asked to evaluate the SIER Game in
comparison to traditional lectures. Test 1 covered both the introductory level of
the model taught in the autumn semester of 1994 and the more complex model
referred to in step B above.
6
D (week 2) Each of the three classes was randomly split into a Game Group (GG) and a
Lecture Group (LG), with each second student being assigned to LG.
E (week 2-4) For three hours divided over three weeks, the GG and LG students followed their
own routes. The GG students were subdivided into competitive teams (‘govern-
ments’) and played the SIER game; the LG students followed lectures on the
model, including discussions of the effects of simulated government policies.
F (week 4) After those three hours, the classes were united again and Test 2 (45 minutes) was
taken. This test contained MC questions on the version of the model that had just
been studied by either lecturing or gaming.
G (week 5-7) Week 5 was free. In weeks 6 and 7 the students received lectures on topics other
than the model referred to above.
H (week 7) At the end of the lecture in week 7, the final lecture of the course, the students
were surprised by an extra test. The topic of the questions in Test 3 was the same
as in Test 2.8
I (week 8-9) This was a course-free period in which students prepared for the final exams.
J (week 10) The final examination on the whole course was held. Part of this exam was Test
4, which contained MC questions on the same topic as Tests 2 and 3. No ques-
tionnaire was added here.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
While most of these steps are self-evident, the function of others or the way in which they were
carried out may need some clarification.
First, as indicated above, Tests 1, 2 and 4 were announced beforehand. The difference between
the scores on Test 1 and Test 2 measures what students learned immediately from being in GG or
LG. The purpose of Test 3 was to measure the extent to which this (increase in) knowledge would
last after a longer period of time. To rule out the possibility that students would perform better on
this test as a result of extra home study efforts, Test 3 came as a surprise to them and students
were informed that their scores on this test would not influence their course grades. This test was
presented as an extra opportunity to practice for the final examination.
Second, to obtain a fair comparison of the two teaching methods (game vs. lectures), we took
the following precaution. During the three hours that the classes were split up (weeks 2-4) they had
different teachers. To compensate for possible differences in the quality of this guidance, the GG
was guided by teacher A and the LG was guided by teacher B during the first 1.5 hours.
7 For the
second 1.5 hours, the two teachers changed groups. In a second class, this sequence was reversed,
compensating for possible impacts of teacher sequence.
Third, in order to avoid ‘teaching to the test’ (cf. Gramlich and Greenlee, 1993, p. 11), teachers
A and B did not know the contents of the tests. The topics of the MC questions were determined
afterwards by a colleague familiar with the model and the game.
Finally, as the design indicates, the GG and the LG were treated the same way (they followed9
the introduction on the economic model together, they received the same study materials and they
had the same teachers), except for the way they studied the comparative dynamics of the model:
the LG students followed lectures on these dynamics, whereas the GG students manipulated the
model themselves. Hence, we may attribute possible differences in learning between the two
groups to the fact that they were subjected to different teaching methods.
4. Results of the Tests
As was explained in the previous section, there were four MC tests of students’ understanding of
the model of international economic relations. The Game Group and the Lecture Group students
were simultaneously subjected to the tests. In the analysis, we will concentrate on those students
that participated in the introductory lecture, Test 1, and Test 2. That is, we delete the data of the
student that was present in weeks 1-3 but not in week 4 (Test 2), as well as the data of the 8
students that missed the introductory lecture (week 1).
8 This leaves us with 38 observations: 19 in
GG and 19 in LG.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 presents the average test scores for tests 1-4 for the Lecture Group and the Game
Group, respectively. As was to be expected in view of our random assignment procedure, the
average pre-knowledge of the model (Score 1) is almost identical for the Game Group (4.98) and
the Lecture Group (4.83). The results for the second test (Score 2), however, show a marked
difference between the two groups. Although both groups score much better on the second test
than on the first, suggesting that they learned a great deal in two weeks’ time, the average score of
the Lecture Group (7.42) is considerably lower than that of the Game Group (8.79). The final row
of Table 2 shows the average increase in scores from Test 1 to Test 2. This, we think, is the purest10
measure of what students have learned about the economic model during either the lectures or the
games. It appears that the average increase in score is substantially larger for the Game Group
(3.81) than for the Lecture Group (2.59). Although the number of observations is relatively small,
the difference between the two groups is significant at the 8% level.
9,10
Admittedly, this strong result in favour of one of the two educational methods is not what we
had anticipated at the time we set up the design. In fact, the reason to have Test 3 was our
anticipation that, although the score increase from Test 1 to Test 2 would probably not be
significantly different for the two groups, it might be different ‘after some time’. Proponents of
gaming often argue that gaming will mainly make the material sink in more deeply than lecturing,
owing to greater student involvement. Test 3 was included to have a test of this argument. We felt
that we could not use the final exam (Test 4) for this purpose, as the knowledge gained in class
(lectures and games) would then be compounded, and perhaps confounded, by the knowledge
gained by private and uncontrolled preparation for the exam. Therefore, we did not announce Test
3, and, to prevent turmoil, students were told that scores would not enter the final course grade.
The results of Test 3 seem to indicate that knowledge slipped away quite dramatically. Interest-
ingly, however, the gap between the two groups observed at Test 2 remains about the same at Test
3, and even becomes somewhat larger (1.37 at Test 2 and 1.48 at Test 3). Hence, there is a weak
indication that knowledge settles in more deeply with gaming, but the strongest hint from Test 3 is
that knowledge can slip away quite easily after a while (or if there is nothing at stake).
11
Finally, Test 4 indicates the effects of lecturing and gaming after the understanding of the
economic model is intensified by private studying. Most interesting, in our view, is that the gap
between the two groups remains about the same (at 1.37 falls back to the difference at Test 2). On
the one hand, this result implies that the effect of gaming is lasting, in the sense that it is not
compensated for or confounded by private studying. On the other hand, it indicates that the
differential effect of gaming and lecturing is not progressive, in the sense that it becomes stronger
over time.
1211
In summary, the main results are that (a) the Game Group learned more about the economic
model than the Lecture Group, as witnessed by the significantly higher increase in scores from
Test 1 to Test 2, and (b) this differential impact of educational method is rather stable over time,
as evidenced by the (almost) constant gap between the two groups.
Finally, we will briefly turn to a potential qualification of these results. The SIER game, like
many other games, is framed in a competitive environment. The goal of the game is to ‘beat the
opponents’. Does this or any other feature of the game (for example, the use of computers) lead to
an anti-female bias in its efficacy? The scores on Test 1 do not differ significantly between males
and females. But the tests on what students learned show a different picture. On the one hand, the
score increase from Test 1 to Test 2 in the Game Group is somewhat higher (but not significantly)
for the nine female students (3.89) than for their ten male counterparts (3.74); on the other hand,
the four female students in the Lecture Group appear to have performed significantly worse (1.05)
than the fifteen male students in that group (3.00).
13 These results suggest that gaming, as
compared to lecturing, provided female students with a better preparation for the multiple-choice
test. If anything, the alleged discriminatory anti-female effect of MC testing (see Walstad and
Soper, 1989, and Watts and Lynch, 1989, for example), is mitigated if students are prepared
through gaming rather than, or in addition to, traditional lectures.
14 However, in view of the
relatively low number of observations we do not wish to put too much emphasis on this result.
5. Results of the Questionnaires and Comparison with the Tests
Attached to the objective Tests 1-3 discussed in the previous section was a questionnaire in which
students were asked to evaluate the SIER game relative to traditional lectures. Remember that all
students had participated in a simpler version of the SIER game in a previous semester. Also, the
students assigned to the Lecture Group can thus be expected to have an opinion on the game.12
Similarly, and more trivially, students assigned to the Game Group have experience with traditional
lectures. Therefore, the questionnaire results allow us to address two questions: How do the
students evaluate the SIER game relative to traditional lectures? and: To what extent do students’
subjective evaluations of gaming versus lecturing correspond to their scores on the objective tests?
Each of the three questionnaires contained seven statements which the students were asked to
rate on a scale of 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). It was stated explicitly that "the
statements compare the lectures using the SIER Game with your (general) experience, at this
institute or elsewhere, with lectures in general economics in which no simulation games were
used". For example, statement (2) reads: "Per hour of lectures, I learned more about economic
relationships using the SIER Game than I learned in the other lectures." Phrased analogously, the
other statements assert (1) it motivates me more, (3) I remember more, (4) I can apply it better, (5)
it is more difficult, (6) it provides more information, (7) it is what I would prefer. In view of the
goals of our present study, we will focus on the results regarding propositions (2) and (7). For
brevity, we will refer to these statements as Learn and Prefer, respectively.
First, how do the students evaluate the SIER game relative to the traditional lectures? The
questionnaires show that both the students in the Game Group and in the Lecture Group became
more enthusiastic about the educational tool they were in fact subjected to.
Consider, for instance, the development of their preference for the game or lectures (Prefer). In
the first questionnaire, attached to Test 1, the students in GG reply with an average score of 2.6,
which about equals the average score of the LG students (2.7). These scores are just below the
neutral response of 3 ("neither agree nor disagree"), that is, the students indicate a slight preference
for lectures. In the questionnaire attached to Test 2, the average scores are 2.4 for LG and 3.0 for
GG. The two groups start to differ in that each group likes what it gets. This effect becomes even
more pronounced in the third questionnaire, attached to Test 3. Here, average scores are 2.3 for LG
and 3.1 for GG. The difference between the two groups in this third questionnaire is still not very
large but it is statistically significant.
15 Similar results are found for the development of the13
answers to Learn.
We may conclude that the students in both the Lecture Group and the Game Group like what
they get. This may also serve as a check on the quality of the lectures (in LG). In the course of the
experiment, the students in LG rated the lectures higher than the game, and higher than the
students in GG. Since the students answered the questionnaires immediately after they had
answered the MC exam questions, we may assume that their answers were also based on the extent
to which they believed that the lectures/the game prepared them for the exam. Hence, if anything,
this indicates that the lectures were of relatively high quality according to the students.
16 Theref-
ore, it is unlikely that the quality of the lectures in our design was so poor as to invalidate the
conclusions drawn in the previous section.
Now, we turn to the second, more interesting question. How do students’ subjective evaluations
correspond to the objective test scores? To put it more bluntly, how reliable are students’
evaluations of the relative efficacy of teaching tools? It is not a trivial task to investigate this
question. Note, for instance, that we have four different objective tests and three different
questionnaires. Furthermore, which of the propositions (e.g., Learn, Remember or Prefer) of the
questionnaire should be used? Moreover, should the absolute values of the questionnaires and tests
be used, or should we use deviations from the class averages? Fortunately, it turns out that the
results of the analysis are not very sensitive to the procedure used. A very robust result is that
there is no significant (cor)relation between the objective test results and the questionnaire data!
Of the several tests we carried out, we present the following, representative and perhaps most
straightforward analysis. The answers to the statement Learn in the questionnaire attached to Test 2
are related to the score increase from Test 1 to Test 2. If students’ evaluations are to some extent
reliable, then students in the Game (Lecture) Group that are more positive (in terms of Learn)
about the game (lecture) should also have a higher increase in test scores.
17 Hence, we would
expect to see a positive correlation between the score increase and the degree to which a student
agrees with the statement that (s)he learns more from the tool that (s)he is in fact subjected to.
1814
It turns out that, instead of a positive we find a small negative (Pearson) correlation coefficient (r=-
0.13). A negative correlation implies that the more a student thinks (s)he learns from a method, the
less (s)he in fact learns as measured by the score increase from Test 1 to Test 2. The correlation
coefficient, however, is not significantly different from zero (p=0.46). Looking at the two groups
separately, it appears that the LG students are somewhat better predictors (r=0.10) than the GG
students (r=-0.20). Neither of the two correlations are significant though.
Other analyses give similar results. We mention four alternatives. One possibility is to relate the
answers of Learn to the absolute scores on a test, instead of the score increase relative to the
previous test. Students might be inclined to answer that they learned more if they think they have a
done a good job at the test they have just completed. Again, however, if we relate the answers to
Learn at Test 2 and Test 3 to the objective scores at those respective tests, we do not find
correlation coefficients that differ significantly from zero. A second possibility is that students give
answers in response to their scores at the previous test. That is, at Test 3 a student might state that
(s)he learned more from a tool if (s)he scored highly at Test 2. However, if we relate Learn at Test
3 to the score at objective Test 2 (or to the score increase from Test 1 to Test 2) again we find no
significant correlation. A third alternative is to use questionnaire answers other than Learn, like
Motivate, Prefer or Remember, and relate these to the test scores or score increases. Also with
these analyses, correlation coefficients are found which are not significantly different from zero
(and are sometimes positive, but more often negative).
19 The final possibility we want to mention
is the use of deviations from the group mean, instead of the absolute values of the tests. A relation
between questionnaires and tests could be blurred by any systematic variation in the results over
the respective groups. By taking deviations from the group mean for each of the six class/tool
combinations we can correct for this. Doing so, however, does not give different results. No
significant relation between questionnaire answers and test results is detectable in the data.
In conclusion, the results fairly consistently indicate that there is no systematic or significant
positive correlation between what students state they learn from an educational tool and what they15
in fact learn as measured by the MC tests.
This result corroborates earlier findings with respect to teacher (as opposed to teaching device)
evaluations. Gramlich and Greenlee (1993), for instance, find only a very weak correlation between
the grading of teachers in student questionnaires (‘SET scores’) and an objective measurement of
what the students of the teachers concerned actually learned (see, also, Shmanske, 1988, and Watts
and Bosshardt, 1991).
6. Conclusions and Summary
The first goal of this study was to assess the efficacy of gaming compared with lecturing. Students
from three classes were randomly assigned to a Lecture Group or a Game Group. For three hours,
the former group followed lectures on the interdependent effects of economic policies in an
international macroeconomic model. Simultaneously, the latter group studied the same topic in a
gaming exercise. A comparison of students’ achievements in standard multiple- choice exams,
immediately before and after the three-hour period, indicated that the Game Group appeared to
have learned more than the Lecture Group. Although the number of participants was limited (38),
the difference was statistically significant.
In addition, the effect of games versus lectures seemed to become neither stronger nor weaker
over time. The advantage of the Game Group over the Lecture Group as obtained immediately
after the three-hour period, remained almost constant at two later tests. Furthermore, we did find
some bias of the game in favour of females. Whereas the female students in the Lecture Group
performed (significantly) worse than the male students, female students in the Game Group did
(non-significantly) better than their male counterparts.
The second goal of the experiment was to compare the (objective) learning achievements of
students to their own (subjective) opinions in this respect. Somewhat discomfortingly perhaps, we
found no systematic or significant correlation between what students stated to have learned from an16
educational tool in the questionnaires and what they actually learned, as measured by the before-
after multiple-choice tests. As evaluations of educational tools (and skill of teachers) often rely on
the opinions of students, this result may, in our view, be regarded as a word of caution.
Of course, a second word of caution is in order. In our comparison of gaming and lecturing and
of subjective and objective tests, we only looked at one particular (macro)economic game.
Furthermore, the number of students taking part was limited. Therefore, we do not feel pressed to
push our findings any further than they go.
Nevertheless, both in methodology and in substance, we hope to have made a useful contribut-
ion. In summary, we have shown that an efficacy test, along the lines suggested by Fels (1993),
though effortful, is possible and can give useful insights. The test was performed in a regular
school situation, it ruled out potential self-selection bias and it used a proper before-after test
format. As far as substance is concerned, our results indicated that the effort to introduce gaming
may be rewarding in terms of learning achievements, but that it may be dangerous to rely on
students’ own judgements in this respect.17
References
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., Hughes, J., McCabe, K., and Rayburn, J., "Capital Market Experience for
Financial Accounting Students", mimeo., Carlson School of Management, University of
Minnesota, December 1994.
Dawson, A., "Macroeconomics Teaching Computer Packages: A Review", Economic Journal,
December 1989, vol. 99, 1275-1283.
DeYoung, R., "Market Experiments: The Laboratory versus the Classroom", Journal of Economic
Education, Fall 1993, vol. 24, 335-351.
Fels, R., "This Is What I Do, and I Like It", Journal of Economic Education, Fall 1993, vol. 24,
365-370.
Gramlich, E.M., and Greenlee, G.A., "Measuring Teaching Performance", Journal of Economic
Education, 1993, vol. 24, 1, 3-13.
Greenblat, C.S., and Duke, R.D., Principles and Practices of Gaming-Simulation, Berverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1981.
Hirschfield, M., Moore, R., and Brown, E., "Exploring the Gender Gap on the GRE Subject Test
in Economics", Journal of Economic Education, Winter 1995, vol. 26, 3-15.
Shmanske, S., "On the Measurement of Teacher Effectiveness", Journal of Economic Education,
Fall 1988, vol. 19, 307-314.
Walstad, W.B., and Soper, J.C., "What is High School Economics? Factors Contributing to Student
Achievement and Attitudes", Journal of Economic Education, Winter 1989.18
Watts, M., and Bosshardt, W., "How Instructors Make a Difference: Panel Data Estimates from
Principles of Economics Courses", The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 73, 1991, 336-
340.
Watts, M., and Lynch, G.J., "The Principles Courses Revisited", American Economic Review, May
1989, vol. 79, 236-241.
Williams, A.W., and Walker, J.M., "Computerized Laboratory Exercises for Microeconomics
Education: Three Applications Motivated by Experimental Economics", Journal of Economic
Education, Fall 1993, vol. 24, 291-315.
Woltjer, G., Coordination in a Macroeconomic Game, Its Design and Role in Education and




























































































































GTable 2. Average scores on the tests for Lecture and Game group
1
variable Lecture Group Game Group t-test
2
Score 1 4.83 (1.57, 19) 4.98 (1.79, 19) -0.27 (0.79)
Score 2 7.42 (1.47, 19) 8.79 (1.81, 19) -2.56 (0.015)
Score 3 4.83 (1.82, 18) 6.31 (1.45, 16) -2.60 (0.014)
Score 4 7.25 (1.71, 19) 8.62 (1.85, 17) -2.31 (0.027)
Score 2 - Score 1
3 2.59 (1.61, 19) 3.81 (2.45, 19) -1.82 (0.078)
1 Average number of correct answers on a scale of 0-12. Standard deviation and number of
observations, respectively, in parentheses. The numbers of observations for Test 3 and 4 are
below 38 because some students did not participate in these tests.
2 t-test statistic with equal variance; two-tailed significance level of difference between parenthe-
ses.Notes
1. This is in line with the first quotation from Fels above. Alternatively, one could, for example, compare
gaming to a discussion of case studies, a student or guest presentation, or a visit to the OECD.
2. In questionnaires, games are usually evaluated positively (e.g., Walker and Williams, 1993, and Woltjer,
1995). This also holds for the game to be described in the next section.
3. For a review of various games with a similar format, see Dawson (1989).
4. The economic model discussed in the Friday class differed from the one in the Wednesday classes in that
exchange rates were to be "fixed but adjustable" instead of flexible, and that nominal wages were assumed to
react (asymmetrically) to changes in the labour income tax rate.
5. Moreover, they were informed of a ‘grade correction factor’: in their total course grade those students who
were assigned to the group that would appear to have learned the least, would be compensated for this
‘unfair’ treatment. This was to prevent injustice and to receive the school’s approval for the experiment.
6. Owing to time schedule restrictions, for the Friday class Test 1 did not contain MC questions. The
necessary information regarding the initial understanding by these students was derived from their scores on
the (MC) examination of the fall 1994 semester as far as the questions on that exam related to the SIER
Game.
7. One of the teachers was the first author of the present paper.
8. As could be expected, the latter 8 students displayed a substantially lower increase in scores from Test 1
to Test 2. Excluding these 8 students cannot cause a (selection) bias in the results. Before the introduction,
students were not yet informed that they were entering an experiment. Hence, they were not yet assigned to
a Game Group or a Lecture Group.
9. The (non-parametric) Mann-Whitney test gives a value of U=126.5 (19,19, d.f.) with a two-tailed
significance level of p=0.11. However, we report t-test results (with equal variance) in the table, because aKolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the hypothesis that the variables follow a normal distribution. Of
course, the variables are discrete {0,1,2,..12} and, strictly speaking, cannot be from a normal distribution.
10. This conclusion would not change if we would exclude the data of the (8) students that missed the
lecture or gaming session of week 3 (but not the introduction of week 1). That is, focussing on those 30
students that followed the complete trajectory of the experiment, the respective results regarding Score 2 -
Score 1 are: for LG: 2.72 (1.65, 17), for GG: 4.18 (2.74, 13), and for the t-test: -1.82 (0.079). We decided to
include these 8 students in our main analysis, because excluding them could make our results prone to a
selfselection bias.
11. Of course, it is also possible that Test 2 was relatively easy compared to Test 3.
12. Note that the scores on Test 4 are (insignificantly) lower than those on Test 2. Possibly, the students
mainly studied for the part of the exam that did not concern their understanding of the economic model,
because most of them already had a standing result from Tests 1 and 2 (a 50% bonus grade). Or, by
coincidence, they may have found Test 2 easy when compared to Test 4 (and Test 3).
13. The two-tailed significance levels for a t-test of equality of mean score increase for males and females
are p=0.90 and p=0.03, for GG and LG, respectively.
14. A recent study by Hirschfield et al. (1995), suggests that ’confidence’ and ’competitiveness’ are
important attributes in explaining the (female) scores on MC tests. Possibly, it is the stimulation of these two
virtues that accounts for the relatively good performance of the (female) GG students.
15. At Test 3, the rating of Prefer differs between GG and LG at a significance level of p=0.05 with a
Mann-Whitney U-test.
16. An alternative check, that focusses on the behaviour of the students rather than on their opinions, is
found in the share of students that were absent in GG and LG, respectively, in weeks were they could not
deserve a bonus grade. In GG this is what happened with 6 out of 19 students, whereas in LG it happened
with 2 out of 19. Hence, also this indicator points to relatively satisfied LG students.17. Once again, note that the students filled in the subjective questionnaire immediately after they had
completed the MC test.
18. To measure the extent to which a student agrees with ’I learn more from what I get’ we took the answer
(on a scale of 1-5) to Learn for the Game Group and 6 minus this answer for the Lecture Group.
19. That the results are similar to those for Learn is not surprising in view of the fact that the answers to the
different statements in the questionnaire are highly correlated.